The Molossian Naval Academy


The Sun-tzu Art of War

Translation and Commentary by Lionel Giles



Index to the Translation




Title Page

01 ~ Laying Plans

02 ~ Waging War

03 ~ Attack by Stratagem

04 ~ Tactical Dispositions

05 ~ Energy

06 ~ Weak Points and Strong


07 ~ Maneuvering

08 ~ Variation in Tactics

09 ~ The Army on the March

10 ~ Terrain

11 ~ The Nine Situations

12 ~ The Attack by Fire

13 ~ The Use of Spies



10. TERRAIN




     [Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13,
deals with "terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch.
XI.  The  "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20,  and the
rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks,
though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.]

     1.  Sun Tzu said:  We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,
to wit:  (1)  Accessible ground;

     [Mei Yao-ch`en says:  "plentifully provided with roads and
means of communications."]

(2)  entangling ground;

     [The same commentator says:  "Net-like country,  venturing
into which you become entangled."]

(3)  temporizing ground;

     [Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."]

(4)  narrow passes; (5)  precipitous heights; (6) positions at a
great distance from the enemy.

     [It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this
classification.  A strange lack of logical perception is shown in
the   Chinaman's unquestioning acceptance of glaring   cross-
divisions such as the above.]

     2.  Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is
called ACCESSIBLE.
     3.  With regard to ground of this nature,  be before the
enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,  and carefully
guard your line of supplies.

     [The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly,  as
Tu Yu says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications."
In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the
communications,"  [1]  we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more
than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I.  ss.
10,  VII. ss. 11.  Col. Henderson says:  "The line of supply may
be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart
to the life of a human being.  Just as the duelist who finds his
adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own
guard astray,  is compelled to conform to his   adversary's
movements,  and to content himself with warding off his thrusts,
so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened
finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he
has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more
or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers
on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat
will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or
surrender of his whole army." [2]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
     4.  Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy
is called ENTANGLING.
     5.  From a position of this sort,  if the enemy   is
unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him.  But if the enemy
is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him,  then,
return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
     6.  When the position is such that neither side will gain by
making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground.

     [Tu Mu says:  "Each side finds it inconvenient to move,  and
the situation remains at a deadlock."]

     7.  In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should
offer us an attractive bait,

     [Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to
flee."   But this is only one of the lures which might induce us
to quit our position.]

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat,
thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army
has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
     8.  With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them
first,  let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of
the enemy.

     [Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie
with us,  and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall
have the enemy at our mercy."]

     9.  Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass,  do
not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it
is weakly garrisoned.
     10.  With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS,  if you   are
beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and
sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

     [Ts`ao Kung says:  "The particular advantage of securing
heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated
by the enemy."   [For the enunciation of the grand principle
alluded to,  see VI.  ss. 2].  Chang Yu tells the following
anecdote of P`ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a
punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes.  "At night he
pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely
fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that
the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by.  This was
highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against
the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men.  P`ei Hsing-
chien,  however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the
camp moved as quickly as possible.  The same night,  a terrific
storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to
the depth of over twelve feet.  The recalcitrant officers were
amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong.
'How did you know what was going to happen?' they asked.  P`ei
Hsing-chien replied:  'From this time forward be content to obey
orders without asking unnecessary questions.'  From this it may
be seen,"  Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places are
advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are
immune from disastrous floods."]

     11.  If the enemy has occupied them before you,  do not
follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.

     [The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D.
against the two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia,  and Wang
Shih-ch`ung,  Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of
Wu-lao,  in spike of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt
to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner.
See CHIU T`ANG, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.]

     12.  If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy,
and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to
provoke a battle,

     [The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long
and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says,  "we
should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."]

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

     13.  These six are the principles connected with Earth.

     [Or perhaps,  "the principles relating to ground."   See,
however, I. ss. 8.]

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful
to study them.
     14.  Now an army is exposed to six several calamities,  not
arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the
general   is   responsible.   These are:    (1)   Flight;   (2)
insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6)
rout.
     15.  Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled
against another ten times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT
of the former.
     16.  When the common soldiers are too strong and their
officers too weak, the result is INSUBORDINATION.

     [Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T`ien Pu [HSIN T`ANG SHU,
ch. 148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an
army against Wang T`ing-ts`ou.  But the whole time he was in
command,  his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt,  and
openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys,
several thousands at a time.  T`ien Pu was powerless to put a
stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed,  he
made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and
dispersed in every direction.  After that, the unfortunate man
committed suicide by cutting his throat.]

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too
weak, the result is COLLAPSE.

     [Ts`ao Kung says:  "The officers are energetic and want to
press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."]

     17.  When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate,
and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a
feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell
whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN.

     [Wang Hsi`s note is:  "This means, the general is angry
without cause,  and at the same time does not appreciate the
ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce
resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head."]

     18.  When the general is weak and without authority;  when
his orders are not clear and distinct;

     [Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says:  "If the commander gives his
orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them
twice;  if his moves are made without vacillation,  the soldiers
will not be in two minds about doing their duty."  General Baden-
Powell says,  italicizing the words:  "The secret of getting
successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell--in
the clearness of the instructions they receive."  [3]  Cf.  also
Wu Tzu ch. 3:  "the most fatal defect in a military leader is
difference;  the worst calamities that befall an army arise from
hesitation."]

when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,

     [Tu Mu says:  "Neither officers nor men have any regular
routine."]

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner,  the
result is utter DISORGANIZATION.
     19.  When a general,  unable to estimate the   enemy's
strength,  allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,  or
hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to
place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT.

     [Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and
continues:   "Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest
spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in
order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to
demoralize the enemy."  Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar  ("De
Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).]

     20.  These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be
carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible
post.

     [See supra, ss. 13.]

     21.  The natural formation of the country is the soldier's
best ally;

     [Ch`en Hao says:  "The advantages of weather and season are
not equal to those connected with ground."]

but a power of estimating the adversary,  of controlling the
forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties,
dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
     22.  He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his
knowledge into practice, will win his battles.  He who knows them
not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated.
     23.  If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must
fight,  even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not
result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's
bidding.

     [Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin.  Huang Shih-kung of the Ch`in dynasty,
who is said to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have
written the SAN LUEH, has these words attributed to him:   "The
responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the
general alone;  if advance and retreat are controlled from the
Palace,  brilliant results will hardly be achieved.  Hence the
god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a
humble part in furthering their country's cause [lit., kneel down
to push the chariot wheel]."  This means that "in matters lying
outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must
be absolute."  Chang Yu also quote the saying:  "Decrees from the
Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."]
     24.  The general who advances without coveting fame and
retreats without fearing disgrace,

     [It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing
of all for a soldier is to retreat.]

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service
for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

     [A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese  "happy
warrior."   Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer
punishment, would not regret his conduct."]

     25.  Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will
follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own
beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

     [Cf.  I. ss. 6.  In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an
engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch`i,  from whose
treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote:   "He
wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his
soldiers,  refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to
sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel,
and shared every hardship with his men.  One of his soldiers was
suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch`i himself sucked out the
virus.  The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and
lamenting.  Somebody asked her, saying:  'Why do you cry?   Your
son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief
himself has sucked the poison from his sore.'  The woman replied,
'Many years ago,  Lord Wu performed a similar service for my
husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death
at the hands of the enemy.  And now that he has done the same for
my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.'"  Li Ch`uan
mentions the Viscount of Ch`u, who invaded the small state of
Hsiao during the winter.  The Duke of Shen said to him:  "Many of
the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold."  So he made a
round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men;  and
straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined
with floss silk.]

     26.  If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your
authority   felt;  kind-hearted,  but unable to enforce   your
commands;  and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder:   then
your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children;  they are
useless for any practical purpose.

     [Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers
afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy.  Tu Mu
recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred
in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang-ling.
He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the
inhabitants nor take anything from them by force.  Nevertheless,
a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a
fellow-townsman,  ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging
to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation
helmet as a protection against the rain.  Lu Meng considered that
the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be
allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly
he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his
face,  however,  as he did so.  This act of severity filled the
army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles
dropped in the highway were not picked up.]

     27.  If we know that our own men are in a condition to
attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack,  we
have gone only halfway towards victory.

     [That is,  Ts`ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is
uncertain."]

     28.  If we know that the enemy is open to attack,  but are
unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack,  we
have gone only halfway towards victory.

     [Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).]

     29.  If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also
know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware
that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable,  we
have still gone only halfway towards victory.
     30.  Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never
bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

     [The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his
measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand.  "He does
not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move,
he makes no mistakes."]

     31.  Hence the saying:  If you know the enemy and know
yourself,  your victory will not stand in doubt;  if you know
Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.

     [Li Ch`uan sums up as follows:  "Given a knowledge of three
things--the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural
advantages of earth--,  victory will invariably crown   your
battles."]


[1]  See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.

[2]  "The Science of War," chap. 2.

[3]  "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.

[Go to Index]

11. THE NINE SITUATIONS



     1.  Sun Tzu said:  The art of war recognizes nine varieties
of ground:   (1)  Dispersive ground;  (2)  facile ground;  (3)
contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting
highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in
ground; (9) desperate ground.
     2.  When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is
dispersive ground.

     [So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes
and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize
the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every
direction.  "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack
the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find
harbors of refuge."]

     3.  When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no
great distance, it is facile ground.

     [Li Ch`uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for
retreating,"   and   the   other   commentators   give    similar
explanations.  Tu Mu remarks:  "When your army has crossed the
border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make
it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."]

     4.  Ground the possession of which imports great advantage
to either side, is contentious ground.

     [Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for."
Ts`ao Kung says:   "ground on which the few and the weak can
defeat the many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass,"
instanced   by Li Ch`uan.  Thus,  Thermopylae was   of   this
classification because the possession of it, even for a few days
only,  meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus
gaining invaluable time.  Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. V.  ad init.:   "For
those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten,  there is
nothing better than a narrow pass."  When Lu Kuang was returning
from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had
got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi,  administrator
of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of
Ch`in,  plotted against him and was for barring his way into the
province.  Yang Han,  governor of Kao-ch`ang,  counseled him,
saying:   "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west,  and
his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome.  If we oppose him in
the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him,
and we must therefore try a different plan.  Let us hasten to
occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting
him off from supplies of water,  and when his troops are
prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without
moving.  Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,
we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass,  which is
nearer.  The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be
expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two
positions."   Liang Hsi,  refusing to act on this advice,  was
overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.]
     5.  Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is
open ground.

     [There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective
for this type of ground.  Ts`ao Kung says it means   "ground
covered with a network of roads," like a chessboard.  Ho Shih
suggested:  "ground on which intercommunication is easy."]

     6.  Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

     [Ts`au Kung defines this as:  "Our country adjoining the
enemy's and a third country conterminous with both."  Meng Shih
instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on
the north-east by Ch`i, on the west by Chin, and on the south by
Ch`u.]

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his
command,

     [The belligerent who holds this dominating position can
constrain most of them to become his allies.]

is a ground of intersecting highways.
     7.  When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile
country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is
serious ground.

     [Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has
reached such a point, its situation is serious."]

     8.  Mountain forests,

     [Or simply "forests."]

rugged steeps,  marshes and fens--all country that is hard to
traverse:  this is difficult ground.
     9.  Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from
which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small
number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our
men:  this is hemmed in ground.
     10.  Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction
by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

     [The situation, as pictured by Ts`ao Kung, is very similar
to the "hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer
possible:   "A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind,
advance impossible, retreat blocked."  Ch`en Hao says:  "to be on
'desperate ground' is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching
in a burning house."   Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid
description of the plight of an army thus entrapped:  "Suppose an
army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides:
--  it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy.  A
ravine on the left,  a mountain on the right,  a pathway so
perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the
chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut
off behind,  no choice but to proceed in single file.  Then,
before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle,
the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene.

Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating,  we
have no haven of refuge.  We seek a pitched battle, but in vain;
yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment's respite.

If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will
crawl by;  the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the
enemy's attacks on front and rear.  The country is wild,
destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the
necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out,
all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so
narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten
thousand;  all means of offense in the hands of the enemy,  all
points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:--in this
terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and
the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the
slightest effect?"  Students of Greek history may be reminded of
the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the
Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes.  [See Thucydides,  VII.
78 sqq.].]

     11.  On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not.  On facile
ground, halt not.  On contentious ground, attack not.

     [But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the
advantageous position first.  So Ts`ao Kung.  Li Ch`uan and
others,  however,  suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has
already forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to
attack.  In the SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King of Wu inquires what
should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies:  "The rule with
regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the
advantage over the other side.  If a position of this kind is
secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him.  Lure him
away by pretending to flee--show your banners and sound your
drums--make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to
lose--trail brushwood and raise a dust--confound his ears and
eyes--detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in
ambuscade.  Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."]

     12.  On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.

     [Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the
blocking   force itself to serious risks.  There   are   two
interpretations available here.  I follow that of Chang Yu.  The
other is indicated in Ts`ao Kung's brief note:   "Draw closer
together"--i.e.,  see that a portion of your own army is not cut
off.]

On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your
allies.
     [Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."]

     13.  On serious ground, gather in plunder.

     [On this, Li Ch`uan has the following delicious note:  "When
an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be
taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment.  Follow the
example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu,  whose march into Ch`in
territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of
valuables.  [Nota bene:  this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause
us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900
A.D.]   Thus he won the hearts of all.  In the present passage,
then,  I think that the true reading must be, not 'plunder,'  but
'do not plunder.'"  Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy
commentator's feelings outran his judgment.  Tu Mu, at least, has
no such illusions.  He says:  "When encamped on 'serious ground,'
there being no inducement as yet to advance further,  and no
possibility of retreat,  one ought to take measures for a
protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides,
and keep a close watch on the enemy."]

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

     [Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.]

     14.  On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

     [Ts`au   Kung says:   "Try the effect of some   unusual
artifice;"  and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying:   "In such a
position,  some scheme must be devised which will suit the
circumstances,  and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy,  the
peril may be escaped."  This is exactly what happened on the
famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains
on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the
dictator Fabius.  The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle
his foes was remarkably like that which T`ien Tan had also
employed with success exactly 62 years before.  [See IX. ss.  24,
note.]  When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the
horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals
being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the
passes which were beset by the enemy.  The strange spectacle of
these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans
that they withdrew from their position,  and Hannibal's army
passed safely through the defile.  [See Polybius, III.  93,  94;
Livy, XXII. 16 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

     [For,  as Chia Lin remarks:  "if you fight with all your
might,  there is a chance of life; where as death is certain if
you cling to your corner."]

     15.  Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how
to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;
     [More literally,  "cause the front and rear to lose touch
with each other."]

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to
hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from
rallying their men.
     16.  When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep
them in disorder.
     17.  When it was to their advantage, they made a forward
move; when otherwise, they stopped still.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en connects this with the foregoing:   "Having
succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward
in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no
advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were."]

     18.  If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in
orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack,  I
should say:   "Begin by seizing something which your opponent
holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."

     [Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind.  Ts`ao Kung
thinks it is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is
depending."   Tu Mu says:  "The three things which an enemy is
anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success
depends,  are:   (1) to capture our favorable positions;  (2)  to
ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications."

Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three
directions and thus render him helpless.  [Cf. III. ss. 3.]   By
boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the
other side on the defensive.]

     19.  Rapidity is the essence of war:

     [According to Tu Mu,  "this is a summary of   leading
principles in warfare," and he adds:  "These are the profoundest
truths of military science,  and the chief business of the
general."   The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih,  shows the
importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest generals.

In 227 A.D.,  Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch`eng under the Wei
Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and
had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister
of that State.  The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military
governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at
once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt,  having
previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import.
Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said:  "If Meng Ta has leagued
himself with Wu and Shu,  the matter should be thoroughly
investigated before we make a move."  Ssu-ma I replied:  "Meng Ta
is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at
once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the
mask."  Then, by a series of forced marches, be brought his army
under the walls of Hsin-ch`eng with in a space of eight days.
Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang:
"Wan is 1200 LI from here.  When the news of my revolt reaches
Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will
be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time
my city will be well fortified.  Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to
come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are
not worth troubling about."  The next letter, however, was filled
with consternation:  "Though only eight days have passed since I
threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates.
What miraculous rapidity is this!"  A fortnight later,  Hsin-
ch`eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head.   [See
CHIN SHU,  ch. 1, f. 3.]  In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from
K`uei-chou in Ssu-ch`uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao
Hsien,  who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in
Hupeh.  It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood,
Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come
down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations.
But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just
about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone
his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for
navigation.  Li Ching replied:  "To the soldier,  overwhelming
speed is of paramount importance,  and he must never miss
opportunities.  Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien
even knows that we have got an army together.  If we seize the
present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before
his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is
heard before you have time to stop your ears against it.  [See
VII. ss. 19, note.]  This is the great principle in war.  Even if
he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his
soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us.
Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours."  All came about as
he predicted,  and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender,  nobly
stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer
the penalty of death.]

take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by
unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
     20.  The following are the principles to be observed by an
invading force:  The further you penetrate into a country,  the
greater will be the solidarity of your troops,  and thus the
defenders will not prevail against you.
     21.  Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your
army with food.

     [Cf.  supra, ss. 13.  Li Ch`uan does not venture on a note
here.]

     22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

     [For  "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them,  humor them,
give them plenty of food and drink,  and look after them
generally."]

and do not overtax them.  Concentrate your energy and hoard your
strength.

     [Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the
famous   general Wang Chien,  whose military genius   largely
contributed to the success of the First Emperor.  He had invaded
the Ch`u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him.
But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all
invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive.  In
vain did the Ch`u general try to force a battle:  day after day
Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out,  but
devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and
confidence of his men.  He took care that they should be well
fed,  sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for
bathing,  and employed every method of judicious indulgence to
weld them into a loyal and homogenous body.  After some time had
elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were
amusing themselves.  The answer was, that they were contending
with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping.  When
Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic
pursuits,  he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the
required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting.  By
this time the Ch`u army, after repeating their challenge again
and again,  had marched away eastwards in disgust.  The Ch`in
general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in
the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter.
Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was conquered by Ch`in, and
the king Fu-ch`u led into captivity.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

     [In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you
are.  It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be
"link your army together."]

and devise unfathomable plans.
     23.  Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no
escape, and they will prefer death to flight.  If they will face
death, there is nothing they may not achieve.

     [Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3):  "If one
man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place,  and
everybody else tried to get our of his way, I should not allow
that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were
contemptible cowards.  The truth is, that a desperado and a man
who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."]

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

     [Chang Yu says:  "If they are in an awkward place together,
they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."]

     24.  Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of
fear.  If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm.  If
they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.  If
there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
     25.  Thus,  without waiting to be marshaled,  the soldiers
will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked,
they will do your will;

     [Literally, "without asking, you will get."]

without restrictions,  they will be faithful;  without giving
orders, they can be trusted.
     26.  Prohibit the taking of omens,  and do away with
superstitious doubts.  Then,  until death itself comes,   no
calamity need be feared.

     [The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears,"
degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths."

Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung:  "'Spells and incantations should
be strictly forbidden,  and no officer allowed to inquire by
divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers'
minds should be seriously perturbed.'   The meaning is,"  he
continues,  "that if all doubts and scruples are discarded,  your
men will never falter in their resolution until they die."]

     27.  If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is
not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are
not unduly long,  it is not because they are disinclined to
longevity.

     [Chang Yu has the best note on this passage:   "Wealth and
long   life are things for which all men have a   natural
inclination.  Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables,  and
sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them,  but
simply that they have no choice."  Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating
that,  as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see
that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown
in their way.]

     28.  On the day they are ordered out to battle,  your
soldiers may weep,

     [The word in the Chinese is "snivel."  This is taken to
indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.]

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down
letting the tears run down their cheeks.

     [Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts`ao Kung
says,  "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die."   We
may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike
in showing their emotion.  Chang Yu alludes to the mournful
parting at the I River between Ching K`o and his friends,  when
the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch`in
(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C.  The tears of all flowed
down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following
lines:   "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn;  Your
champion is going--Not to return." [1] ]

But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the
courage of a Chu or a Kuei.

     [Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu
State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by
Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his
sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly
of a fish served up at a banquet.  He succeeded in his attempt,
but was immediately hacked to pieced by the king's bodyguard.
This was in 515 B.C.  The other hero referred to, Ts`ao Kuei  (or
Ts`ao Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous
166 years earlier, in 681 B.C.  Lu had been thrice defeated by
Ch`i,  and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a
large slice of territory, when Ts`ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan
Kung, the Duke of Ch`i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a
dagger against his chest.  None of the duke's retainers dared to
move   a muscle,  and Ts`ao Kuei proceeded to demand   full
restitution, declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because
she was a smaller and a weaker state.  Huan Kung, in peril of his
life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts`ao Kuei flung away his
dagger   and quietly resumed his place amid the   terrified
assemblage without having so much as changed color.  As was to be
expected,  the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain,
but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the
impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold
stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three
pitched battles.]

     29.  The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN.

Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch`ang
mountains.

     ["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in
question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its
movements.  Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now
come to be used in the sense of "military maneuvers."]

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail;  strike
at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its
middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.
     30.  Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN,

     [That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it possible to make the
front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on
the other,  just as though they were part of a single living
body?"]

I should answer, Yes.  For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are
enemies;
     [Cf. VI. ss. 21.]

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught
by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the
left hand helps the right.

     [The meaning is:  If two enemies will help each other in a
time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same
army,  bound together as they are by every tie of interest and
fellow-feeling.  Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has
been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case
of allied armies.]

     31.  Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the
tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the
ground

     [These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running
away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor
with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened
himself firmly to one spot.  [See Herodotus, IX. 74.]  It is not
enough,  says Sun Tzu,  to render flight impossible by such
mechanical means.  You will not succeed unless your men have
tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all,  a spirit of
sympathetic cooperation.  This is the lesson which can be learned
from the SHUAI-JAN.]

     32.  The principle on which to manage an army is to set up
one standard of courage which all must reach.

     [Literally,  "level the courage [of all] as though [it were
that of]  one."  If the ideal army is to form a single organic
whole,  then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its
component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must
not fall below a certain standard.  Wellington's seemingly
ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he
had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in
this important particular--unity of spirit and courage.  Had he
not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those
troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the
day.]

     33.  How to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a
question involving the proper use of ground.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is:  "The way to eliminate the
differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to
utilize accidental features of the ground."   Less reliable
troops,  if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as
better troops on more exposed terrain.  The advantage of position
neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage.   Col.
Henderson says:  "With all respect to the text books, and to the
ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study
of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient
importance is attached to the selection of positions...  and to
the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are
defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural
features." [2] ]

     34.  Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as
though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

     [Tu Mu says:  "The simile has reference to the ease with
which he does it."]

     35.  It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
     36.  He must be able to mystify his officers and men by
false reports and appearances,

     [Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."]

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

     [Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms:  "The
troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the
beginning;  they may only rejoice with you over their happy
outcome."  "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one
of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed
out.  But how about the other process--the mystification of one's
own men?  Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on
this point would do well to read Col.  Henderson's remarks on
Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign:  "The infinite pains,"  he
says,  "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most
trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions,  and his
thoughts,  a commander less thorough would have   pronounced
useless"--etc.  etc. [3]  In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch.
47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch`ao took the field with 25,000 men
from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of
crushing Yarkand.  The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his
chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the
kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t`ou, totaling 50,000 men.
Pan Ch`ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a
council of war, and said:  'Our forces are now outnumbered and
unable to make head against the enemy.  The best plan, then,  is
for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction.
The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I
will then return myself towards the west.  Let us wait until the
evening drum has sounded and then start.'  Pan Ch`ao now secretly
released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of
Kutcha was thus informed of his plans.  Much elated by the news,
the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar
Pan Ch`ao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode
eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of
Khotan.  As soon as Pan Ch`ao knew that the two chieftains had
gone,  he called his divisions together, got them well in hand,
and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it
lay encamped.  The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion,
and were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao.  Over 5000 heads were
brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of
horses and cattle and valuables of every description.  Yarkand
then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their
respective forces.  From that time forward, Pan Ch`ao's prestige
completely overawed the countries of the west."  In this case, we
see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in
ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of
dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.]

     37.  By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,

     [Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same
stratagem twice.]

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.

     [Chang Yu,  in a quotation from another work,  says:   "The
axiom,  that war is based on deception, does not apply only to
deception of the enemy.  You must deceive even your own soldiers.

Make them follow you, but without letting them know why."]

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes,  he prevents
the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
     38.  At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like
one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder
behind him.  He carries his men deep into hostile territory
before he shows his hand.

     [Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that is,
takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army
to return--like Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a
river.  Ch`en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words
less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."]

     39.  He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a
shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and
that, and nothing knows whither he is going.

     [Tu Mu says:   "The army is only cognizant of orders to
advance or retreat;  it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of
attacking and conquering."]

     40.  To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may
be termed the business of the general.

     [Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no
delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's heart.  Note how he returns
again and again to this point.  Among the warring states of
ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear
and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.]

     41.  The different measures suited to the nine varieties of
ground;

     [Chang Yu says:  "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting
the rules for the nine varieties of ground.]

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics;  and the
fundamental laws of human nature:  these are things that must
most certainly be studied.
     42.  When invading hostile territory, the general principle
is,  that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a
short way means dispersion.

     [Cf. supra, ss. 20.]

     43.  When you leave your own country behind, and take your
army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical
ground.

     [This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but it
does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities
in chap. X.  One's first impulse would be to translate it distant
ground," but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely
what is not meant here.  Mei Yao-ch`en says it is "a position not
far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near enough to
home to be 'dispersive,' but something between the two."  Wang Hsi
says:  "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state,
whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it.
Hence,  it is incumbent on us to settle our business there
quickly."   He adds that this position is of rare occurrence,
which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine
Situations.]

When there are means of communication on all four sides,  the
ground is one of intersecting highways.
     44.  When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious
ground.  When you penetrate but a little way,  it is facile
ground.
     45.  When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and
narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground.  When there is no
place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
     46.  Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men
with unity of purpose.

     [This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining
on the defensive, and avoiding battle.  Cf. supra, ss. 11.]

On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection
between all parts of my army.

     [As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible
contingencies:   "(1)  the desertion of our own troops;  (2)  a
sudden attack on the part of the enemy."  Cf. VII. ss. 17.  Mei
Yao-ch`en says:  "On the march, the regiments should be in close
touch;  in an encampment, there should be continuity between the
fortifications."]

     47.  On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

     [This is Ts`ao Kung's interpretation.  Chang Yu adopts it,
saying:   "We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and
tail may both reach the goal."  That is, they must not be allowed
to straggle up a long way apart.  Mei Yao-ch`en offers another
equally plausible explanation:  "Supposing the enemy has not yet
reached the coveted position, and we are behind him,  we should
advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession."
Ch`en Hao,  on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had
time to select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu
warns us against coming exhausted to the attack.  His own idea of
the situation is rather vaguely expressed:   "If there is a
favorable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of
troops to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers,
come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their
rear with your main body, and victory will be assured."  It was
thus,  he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch`in.  (See p.
57.)]

     48.  On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my
defenses.   On   ground of intersecting highways,   I   would
consolidate my alliances.
     49.  On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous
stream of supplies.

     [The commentators take this as referring to forage and
plunder,  not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication
with a home base.]

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
     50.  On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.

     [Meng Shih says:  "To make it seem that I meant to defend
the position,  whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly
through the enemy's lines."  Mei Yao-ch`en says:  "in order to
make my soldiers fight with desperation."   Wang Hsi says,
"fearing lest my men be tempted to run away."  Tu Mu points out
that this is the converse of VII. ss. 36, where it is the enemy
who is surrounded.  In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and
canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh-
chu Chao and others.  His own force was comparatively small,
consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot.
The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together,
gaps being left at certain points.  But Kao Huan,  instead of
trying to escape,  actually made a shift to block all the
remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen
and donkeys roped together.  As soon as his officers and men saw
that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die,  their
spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation,  and they
charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks
broke and crumbled under their onslaught.]
On desperate ground,  I would proclaim to my soldiers the
hopelessness of saving their lives.

     Tu Yu says:  "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away
your stores and provisions, choke up the wells,  destroy your
cooking-stoves,  and make it plain to your men that they cannot
survive, but must fight to the death."  Mei Yao-ch`en says:  "The
only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it."   This
concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about  "grounds"  and the
"variations" corresponding to them.  Reviewing the passages which
bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by
the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated.
Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate  "variations"
before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five,
namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is
not included in it.  A few varieties of ground are dealt with in
the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six
new grounds, with six variations of plan to match.  None of these
is   mentioned   again,  though the first is hardly   to   be
distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter.  At last, in
chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately
followed by the variations.  This takes us down to ss.  14.  In
SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and
9  (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed
in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated
once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5,  6
and 7, being different from those previously given.  Though it is
impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text,  a
few suggestive facts maybe brought into prominence:   (1)  Chap.
VIII,  according to the title, should deal with nine variations,
whereas only five appear.  (2) It is an abnormally short chapter.

(3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds.  Several of these are
defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of
the corresponding variations.  (4) The length of the chapter is
disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX.  I do
not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the
general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot have come down to
us in the shape in which it left his hands:   chap.  VIII is
obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to
contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or
ought to appear elsewhere.]

     51.  For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an
obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he
cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into
danger.

     [Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao's devoted
followers in 73 A.D.  The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch.
47:  "When Pan Ch`ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the
country, received him at first with great politeness and respect;
but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change,
and he became remiss and negligent.  Pan Ch`ao spoke about this
to the officers of his suite:  'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that
Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane?  This must signify
that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians,  and that
consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with
which side to throw in his lot.  That surely is the reason.  The
truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have
come to pass;  how much more, then,  those that are already
manifest!'   Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been
assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying:   'Where
are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?'
The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he
presently blurted out the whole truth.  Pan Ch`ao,  keeping his
informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general
gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking
with them.  When the wine had mounted into their heads a little,
he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them
thus:   'Gentlemen,  here we are in the heart of an isolated
region,  anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great
exploit.  Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no
arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is
that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal
host has disappeared.  Should this envoy prevail upon him to
seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will
become food for the wolves of the desert.  What are we to do?'
With one accord, the officers replied:  'Standing as we do in
peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and
death.'  For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. ss.  1,
note.]

     52.  We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes
until we are acquainted with their designs.  We are not fit to
lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of
the   country--its mountains and forests,  its pitfalls   and
precipices,  its marshes and swamps.  We shall be unable to turn
natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.

     [These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14  --
in order to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to
think.  I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to
form an antecedent to the following words.  With regard to local
guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of
going   wrong,   either   through   their   treachery   or   some
misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13):  Hannibal,  we
are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of
Casinum,  where there was an important pass to be occupied;  but
his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin
names,  caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of
Casinum,  and turning from his proper route, he took the army in
that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had
almost arrived.]

     53.  To be ignored of any one of the following four or five
principles does not befit a warlike prince.
     54.  When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state,  his
generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the
enemy's forces.  He overawes his opponents, and their allies are
prevented from joining against him.

     [Mei Tao-ch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning
that are so much affected by the Chinese:   "In attacking a
powerful state,  if you can divide her forces, you will have a
superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength,
you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy,  the
neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring
states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from
joining her."  The following gives a stronger meaning:  "If the
great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to
summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and
refrain from massing their forces."  Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu take
the sentence in quite another way.  The former says:   "Powerful
though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be
unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on
external aid;  if he dispenses with this, and with overweening
confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the
enemy, he will surely be defeated."  Chang Yu puts his view thus:

"If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be
discontented and hang back.  But if (as will then be the case)
our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the
enemy,  the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join
us."]

     55.  Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and
sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states.  He carries
out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.

     [The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be
this:   Secure against a combination of his enemies,  "he can
afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own
secret designs, his prestige enable him to dispense with external
friendships."]

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their
kingdoms.

     [This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in
State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy
by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for
her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti.  Chang Yu,  following up
his previous note,  thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this
attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.]

     56.  Bestow rewards without regard to rule,

     [Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says:  "Let advance be richly
rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."]

issue orders
     [Literally, "hang" or post up."]

without regard to previous arrangements;

     ["In order to prevent treachery,"  says Wang Hsi.  The
general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung's quotation from the
SSU-MA FA:  "Give instructions only on sighting the enemy;  give
rewards when you see deserving deeds."  Ts`ao Kung's paraphrase:
"The final instructions you give to your army should not
correspond with those that have been previously posted up."
Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be
divulged beforehand."  And Chia Lin says:  "there should be no
fixity in your rules and arrangements."  Not only is there danger
in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the
entire reversal of them at the last moment.]

and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to
do with but a single man.

     [Cf. supra, ss. 34.]

     57.  Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let
them know your design.

     [Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your
reasons for any order.  Lord Mansfield once told a junior
colleague to "give no reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim
is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.]

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell
them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
     58.  Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive;
plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.

     [These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in
explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most
brilliant battles, already alluded to on p. 28.  In 204 B.C.,  he
was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the
mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in
full force.  Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light
cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag.  Their
instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and
keep a secret watch on the enemy.  "When the men of Chao see me
in full flight,"  Han Hsin said,  "they will abandon their
fortifications and give chase.  This must be the sign for you to
rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners
of Han in their stead."  Turning then to his other officers,  he
remarked:   "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not
likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and
drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and
escape through the mountains."  So saying, he first of all sent
out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form
in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti.  Seeing this
maneuver,  the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter.  By
this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin,  displaying the
generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating,
and was immediately engaged by the enemy.  A great battle
followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his
colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field,  fled
to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle
was raging.  The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure
the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two
generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting
with the utmost desperation.  The time had now come for the 2000
horsemen to play their part.  As soon as they saw the men of Chao
following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted
walls,  tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of
Han.  When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight
of these red flags struck them with terror.  Convinced that the
Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild
disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in
vain.  Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and
completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest,
amongst whom was King Ya himself....  After the battle, some of
Han Hsin's officers came to him and said:  "In the ART OF WAR we
are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river
or marsh on the left front.  [This appears to be a blend of Sun
Tzu and T`ai Kung.  See IX ss. 9, and note.]   You,  on the
contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our
back.  Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the
victory?"   The general replied:  "I fear you gentlemen have not
studied the Art of War with sufficient care.  Is it not written
there:  'Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come
off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive'?
Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to
bring my colleague round.  What says the Military Classic--'Swoop
down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.'   [This
passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.]  If I had
not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to
fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own
discretion,  there would have been a general debandade,  and it
would have been impossible to do anything with them."   The
officers admitted the force of his argument, and said:   "These
are higher tactics than we should have been capable of."   [See
CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ]

     59.  For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's
way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.

     [Danger has a bracing effect.]

     60.  Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating
ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

     [Ts`ao Kung says:  "Feign stupidity"--by an appearance of
yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes.  Chang Yu's note
makes the meaning clear:  "If the enemy shows an inclination to
advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay
on purpose that he may carry out his intention."  The object is
to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our
attack.]

     61.  By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank,

     [I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the
enemy in one direction."  Ts`ao Kung says:  "unite the soldiers
and make for the enemy."  But such a violent displacement of
characters is quite indefensible.]

we shall succeed in the long run

     [Literally, "after a thousand LI."]

in killing the commander-in-chief.

     [Always a great point with the Chinese.]

     62.  This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer
cunning.
     63.  On the day that you take up your command,  block the
frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,

     [These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was
issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a
gate.  Cf. the "border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have
had similar duties.  When this half was returned to him, within a
fixed period,  he was authorized to open the gate and let the
traveler through.]

and stop the passage of all emissaries.

     [Either to or from the enemy's country.]

     64.  Be stern in the council-chamber,

     [Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified
by the sovereign.]

so that you may control the situation.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en understands the whole sentence to mean:  Take
the   strictest   precautions   to   ensure   secrecy   in   your
deliberations.]

     65.  If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
     66.  Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,

     [Cf. supra, ss. 18.]

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

     [Ch`en Hao`s explanation:  "If I manage to seize a favorable
position,  but the enemy does not appear on the scene,  the
advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical
account.  He who intends therefore, to occupy a position of
importance to the enemy,  must begin by making an   artful
appointment,  so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him
into going there as well."  Mei Yao-ch`en explains that this
"artful appointment"  is to be made through the medium of the
enemy's own spies,  who will carry back just the amount of
information that we choose to give them.  Then, having cunningly
disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after
the enemy,  to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4).  We must start
after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive
before him in order to capture the place without trouble.  Taken
thus,  the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch`en's
interpretation of ss. 47.]

     67.  Walk in the path defined by rule,

     [Chia Lin says:  "Victory is the only thing that matters,
and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons."
It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight
authority,   for the sense yielded is certainly much   more
satisfactory.  Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of
the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating
every accepted canon of warfare.]

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a
decisive battle.

     [Tu Mu says:   "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a
favorable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a
battle that shall prove decisive."]

     68.  At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden,  until
the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity
of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to
oppose you.

     [As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity,  the
comparison hardly appears felicitous.  But of course Sun Tzu was
thinking only of its speed.  The words have been taken to mean:
You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare;  but
this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.]


[1]  Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.

[2]  "The Science of War," p. 333.

[3]  "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.

[Go to Index]

12. THE ATTACK BY FIRE




     [Rather more than half the chapter (SS. 1-13) is devoted to
the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into
other topics.]

     1.  Sun Tzu said:  There are five ways of attacking with
fire.  The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;

     [So Tu Mu.  Li Ch`uan says:  "Set fire to the camp, and kill
the soldiers"  (when they try to escape from the flames).  Pan
Ch`ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see
XI.  ss. 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by the
unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu  [the mortal
enemies of the Chinese].  In consultation with his officers,  he
exclaimed:  "Never venture, never win! [1]  The only course open
to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under
cover of night,  when they will not be able to discern our
numbers.  Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them
completely;  this will cool the King's courage and cover us with
glory,  besides ensuring the success of our mission.'   the
officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the
matter first with the Intendant.  Pan Ch`ao then fell into a
passion:   'It is today,' he cried, 'that our fortunes must be
decided!   The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian,  who on
hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything
will be brought to light.  An inglorious death is no worthy fate
for valiant warriors.'   All then agreed to do as he wished.
Accordingly,  as soon as night came on, he and his little band
quickly made their way to the barbarian camp.  A strong gale was
blowing at the time.  Pan Ch`ao ordered ten of the party to take
drums and hide behind the enemy's barracks, it being arranged
that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming
and yelling with all their might.  The rest of his men,  armed
with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of
the camp.  He then set fire to the place from the windward side,
whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the
front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in
frantic disorder.  Pan Ch`ao slew three of them with his own
hand,  while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and
thirty of his suite.  The remainder, more than a hundred in all,
perished in the flames.  On the following day,  Pan Ch`ao,
divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand:  'Although you
did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking
sole credit for our exploit.'  This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan
Ch`ao,  having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the
head of the barbarian envoy.  The whole kingdom was seized with
fear and trembling,  which Pan Ch`ao took steps to allay by
issuing a public proclamation.  Then, taking the king's sons as
hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku."  HOU HAN SHU,
ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ]
the second is to burn stores;

     [Tu Mu says:  "Provisions, fuel and fodder."  In order to
subdue   the   rebellious population of Kiangnan,   Kao   Keng
recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids
and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run
proved entirely successful.]

the third is to burn baggage trains;

     [An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao`s wagons
and impedimenta by Ts`ao Ts`ao in 200 A.D.]

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;

     [Tu Mu says that the things contained in  "arsenals"  and
"magazines"  are the same.  He specifies weapons and other
implements, bullion and clothing.  Cf. VII. ss. 11.]

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

     [Tu Yu says in the T`UNG TIEN:  "To drop fire into the
enemy's camp.  The method by which this may be done is to set the
tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier,  and then
shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines."]

     2.  In order to carry out an attack, we must have means
available.

     [T`sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp"  are
referred to.  But Ch`en Hao is more likely to be right in saying:

"We must have favorable circumstances in general,  not merely
traitors to help us."  Chia Lin says:  "We must avail ourselves
of wind and dry weather."]

the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.

     [Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire:  "dry vegetable
matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc."  Here we have
the material cause.  Chang Yu says:  "vessels for hoarding fire,
stuff for lighting fires."]

     3.  There is a proper season for making attacks with fire,
and special days for starting a conflagration.
     4.  The proper season is when the weather is very dry;  the
special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of
the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;

     [These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of
the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions,  corresponding roughly to
Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.]

for these four are all days of rising wind.
     5.  In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet
five possible developments:
     6.  (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond
at once with an attack from without.
     7.  (2)  If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's
soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

     [The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the
enemy into confusion.  If this effect is not produced, it means
that the enemy is ready to receive us.  Hence the necessity for
caution.]

     8.  (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height,
follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay
where you are.

     [Ts`ao Kung says:  "If you see a possible way, advance;  but
if you find the difficulties too great, retire."]

     9.  (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from
without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your
attack at a favorable moment.

     [Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to
the fire breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by
the agency of incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp.  "But,"  he
continues,  "if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered
with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a
position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against
him at any seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of
an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should
themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus render
our own attempts fruitless."  The famous Li Ling once baffled the
leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way.  The latter,  taking
advantage of a favorable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese
general's camp,  but found that every scrap of combustible
vegetation in the neighborhood had already been burnt down.  On
the other hand, Po-ts`ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels,
was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple
precaution.  "At the head of a large army he was besieging
Ch`ang-she,  which was held by Huang-fu Sung.  The garrison was
very small,  and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the
ranks;  so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said:
"In war,  there are various indirect methods of attack,  and
numbers do not count for everything.  [The commentator here
quotes Sun Tzu, V. SS. 5, 6 and 10.]  Now the rebels have pitched
their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn
when the wind blows.  If we set fire to it at night, they will be
thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on
all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T`ien Tan.'
[See p. 90.]  That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up;  so
Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into
torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent
out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through
the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells.
Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and
Huang-fu Sung,  sounding his drums, led a rapid charge,  which
threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight."

[HOU HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ]

     10.  (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it.  Do
not attack from the leeward.

     [Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says:  "When you make a fire,
the enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat
and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not
conduce to your success."  A rather more obvious explanation is
given by Tu Mu:  "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to
the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from
that side.  If you start the fire on the east side,  and then
attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your
enemy."]

     11.  A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long,  but a
night breeze soon falls.

     [Cf.  Lao Tzu's saying:  "A violent wind does not last the
space of a morning."  (TAO TE CHING, chap. 23.)   Mei Yao-ch`en
and Wang Hsi say:  "A day breeze dies down at nightfall,  and a
night breeze at daybreak.  This is what happens as a general
rule."   The phenomenon observed may be correct enough,  but how
this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.]

     12.  In every army, the five developments connected with
fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a
watch kept for the proper days.

     [Tu Mu says:  "We must make calculations as to the paths of
the stars,  and watch for the days on which wind will rise,
before making our attack with fire."  Chang Yu seems to interpret
the text differently:  "We must not only know how to assail our
opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar
attacks from them."]

     13.  Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show
intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an
accession of strength.
     14.  By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not
robbed of all his belongings.

     [Ts`ao Kung's note is:  "We can merely obstruct the enemy's
road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated
stores."  Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible
destructive power of fire.  This is the reason,  Chang Yu
concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of sentences,
whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail.  Wu Tzu  (ch.
4)  speaks thus of the two elements:  "If an army is encamped on
low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and
where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood.  If
an army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with
weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales,  it may be
exterminated by fire."]

     15.  Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles
and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of
enterprise;  for the result is waste of time and   general
stagnation.

     [This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu.
Ts`ao Kung says:   "Rewards for good service should not be
deferred a single day."   And Tu Mu:   "If you do not take
opportunity   to   advance and reward   the   deserving,   your
subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will
ensue."   For several reasons, however, and in spite of the
formidable array of scholars on the other side,  I prefer the
interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch`en alone, whose words I
will quote:  "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their
battles and assaults must seize the favorable moments when they
come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures:  that is to
say, they must resort to such means of attack of fire, water and
the like.  What they must not do, and what will prove fatal,  is
to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they have got."]

     16.  Hence the saying:  The enlightened ruler lays his plans
well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.

     [Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH, ch. 2:   "The
warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them
together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable.
If faith decays,  there will be disruption;  if rewards are
deficient, commands will not be respected."]

     17.  Move not unless you see an advantage;  use not your
troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless
the position is critical.

     [Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious,  but he
never goes so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in
the TAO TE CHING, ch. 69.  "I dare not take the initiative,  but
prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance an inch,  but
prefer to retreat a foot."]

     18.  No ruler should put troops into the field merely to
gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply
out of pique.
     19.  If it is to your advantage, make a forward move;  if
not, stay where you are.

     [This is repeated from XI. ss. 17.  Here I feel convinced
that it is an interpolation, for it is evident that ss. 20 ought
to follow immediately on ss. 18.]
     20.  Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be
succeeded by content.
     21.  But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never
come again into being;

     [The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of
this saying.]

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.
     22.  Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good
general full of caution.  This is the way to keep a country at
peace and an army intact.


[1]   "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of
the tiger's cubs."

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13. THE USE OF SPIES




     1.  Sun Tzu said:  Raising a host of a hundred thousand men
and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the
people and a drain on the resources of the State.  The daily
expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.

     [Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.]

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop
down exhausted on the highways.

     [Cf.  TAO TE CHING,  ch.  30:   "Where troops have been
quartered, brambles and thorns spring up.  Chang Yu has the note:

"We may be reminded of the saying:  'On serious ground, gather in
plunder.'   Why then should carriage and transportation cause
exhaustion on the highways?--The answer is, that not victuals
alone,  but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to
the army.  Besides, the injunction to 'forage on the enemy'  only
means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory,
scarcity of food must be provided against.  Hence, without being
solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order
that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies.  Then,
again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions being
unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."]

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in
their labor.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en says:  "Men will be lacking at the plough-
tail."  The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine
parts, each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center
being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the
other eight.  It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us,  that their
cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common.

[See II. ss. 12, note.]  In time of war, one of the families had
to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its
support.  Thus,  by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able-
bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families
would be affected.]

     2.  Hostile armies may face each other for years,  striving
for the victory which is decided in a single day.  This being so,
to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because
one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors
and emoluments,

     ["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil
the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were
actually mentioned at this point.]

is the height of inhumanity.

     [Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious.  He begins by
adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood
and treasure which war always brings in its train.  Now,  unless
you are kept informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to
strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years.  The
only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is
impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly
paid for their services.  But it is surely false economy to
grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose,  when
every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum.

This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor,  and
hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is
nothing less than a crime against humanity.]

     3.  One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help
to his sovereign, no master of victory.

     [This idea, that the true object of war is peace,  has its
root in the national temperament of the Chinese.  Even so far
back as 597 B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince
Chuang of the Ch`u State:  "The [Chinese] character for 'prowess'
is made up of [the characters for] 'to stay'  and  'a spear'
(cessation of hostilities).  Military prowess is seen in the
repression   of   cruelty,  the calling in of   weapons,   the
preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment
of merit,  the bestowal of happiness on the people,  putting
harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."]

     4.  Thus,  what enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the
reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.

     [That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he
means to do.]

     5.  Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;
it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,

     [Tu Mu's note is:  "[knowledge of the enemy]  cannot be
gained by reasoning from other analogous cases."]

nor by any deductive calculation.

     [Li   Ch`uan says:   "Quantities like   length,   breadth,
distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical
determination; human actions cannot be so calculated."]

     6.  Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be
obtained from other men.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en has rather an interesting note:   "Knowledge
of the spirit-world is to be obtained by divination;  information
in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws
of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation:  but
the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and
spies alone."]

     7.  Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:
(1)  Local spies;  (2) inward spies; (3)  converted spies;  (4)
doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
     8.  When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can
discover the secret system.  This is called "divine manipulation
of the threads."  It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.

     [Cromwell,  one of the greatest and most practical of all
cavalry leaders,  had officers styled  'scout masters,'  whose
business it was to collect all possible information regarding the
enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in
war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy's moves
thus gained." [1] ]

     9.  Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the
inhabitants of a district.

     [Tu Mu says:  "In the enemy's country, win people over by
kind treatment, and use them as spies."]

     10.  Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the
enemy.

     [Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good
service in this respect:  "Worthy men who have been degraded from
office,  criminals who have undergone punishment; also,  favorite
concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at
being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in
the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side
should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of
displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always
want to have a foot in each boat.  Officials of these several
kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to
one's interests by means of rich presents.  In this way you will
be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country,
ascertain the plans that are being formed against you,  and
moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the
sovereign and his ministers."  The necessity for extreme caution,
however,  in dealing with  "inward spies,"  appears from   an
historical incident related by Ho Shih:  "Lo Shang, Governor of
I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of
Shu in his stronghold at P`i.  After each side had experienced a
number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the
services of a certain P`o-t`ai, a native of Wu-tu.  He began to
have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to
Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him
from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right
moment for making a general assault.  Lo Shang,  confiding in
these promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po
and others at their head with orders to attack at P`o-t`ai's
bidding.  Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared
an ambuscade on their line of march; and P`o-t`ai, having reared
long scaling-ladders against the city walls,  now lighted the
beacon-fire.  Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and
began climbing the ladders as fast as they could,  while others
were drawn up by ropes lowered from above.  More than a hundred
of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of
whom was forthwith beheaded.  Li Hsiung then charged with all his
forces,  both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy
completely."  [This happened in 303 A.D.  I do not know where Ho
Shih got the story from.  It is not given in the biography of Li
Hsiung or that of his father Li T`e, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.]

     11.  Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's
spies and using them for our own purposes.

     [By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching
them from the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back
false information as well as to spy in turn on their own
countrymen.  On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we
pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry
away a false impression of what is going on.  Several of the
commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that
it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his
subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously
(ss. 21 sqq.).  Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted
spies were used with conspicuous success:  (1) by T`ien Tan in
his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his
march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C.,
when Lien P`o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch`in.
The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P`o's cautious and
dilatory methods,  which had been unable to avert a series of
minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of
his spies,  who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were
already in Fan Chu's pay.  They said:  "The only thing which
causes Ch`in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general.
Lien P`o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be
vanquished in the long run."  Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the
famous Chao She.  From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed
in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came
to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who
could stand against him.  His father was much disquieted by this
overweening conceit,  and the flippancy with which he spoke of
such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever
Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of
Chao.  This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from
his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now
sent to succeed Lien P`o.  Needless to say, he proved no match
for the redoubtable Po Ch`i and the great military power of
Ch`in.  He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into
two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance
lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one
another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force,
amounting,  it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the
sword.]

     12.  Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for
purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and
report them to the enemy.

     [Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning:   "We
ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies,  who
must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed.

Then,  when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines,  they
will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take
measures accordingly,  only to find that we do something quite
different.  The spies will thereupon be put to death."   As an
example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released
by Pan Ch`ao in his campaign against Yarkand.  (See p. 132.)   He
also refers to T`ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T`ai
Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security,
until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him.
Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T`ang
Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the
New   T`ang History  (ch.  58,  fol.  2 and ch.  89,  fol.  8
respectively)  that he escaped and lived on until 656.  Li I-chi
played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King
of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch`i.  He has certainly
more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch`i,
being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin,  and
infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi,
ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.]

     13.  SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news
from the enemy's camp.

     [This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called,
forming a regular part of the army.  Tu Mu says:  "Your surviving
spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance
a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron.  He must be
active,  robust,  endowed with physical strength and courage;
thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure
hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy."  Ho Shih
tells the following story of Ta`hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty:  "When
he was governor of Eastern Ch`in, Shen-wu of Ch`i made a hostile
movement upon Sha-yuan.  The Emperor T`ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu]  sent
Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy.  He was accompanied by two other
men.  All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform.
When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from
the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen,  until they
succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army.  Then they
got on their horses again and boldly passed through the camp
under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once,  happening
to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of
discipline,  they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound
cudgeling!  Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible
information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm
commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report
was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."]

     14.  Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more
intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.

     [Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en point out that the spy is
privileged to enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.]

None should be more liberally rewarded.  In no other business
should greater secrecy be preserved.

     [Tu Mu gives a graphic touch:  all communication with spies
should be carried "mouth-to-ear."  The following remarks on spies
may be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them
than any previous commander:  "Spies are attached to those who
give them most,  he who pays them ill is never served.  They
should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one
another.  When they propose anything very material, secure their
persons,  or have in your possession their wives and children as
hostages for their fidelity.  Never communicate anything to them
but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ]

     15.  Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain
intuitive sagacity.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en says:  "In order to use them, one must know
fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty
and double-dealing."   Wang Hsi in a different interpretation
thinks more along the lines of  "intuitive perception"  and
"practical   intelligence."    Tu Mu strangely   refers   these
attributes to the spies themselves:  "Before using spies we must
assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the
extent of their experience and skill."  But he continues:   "A
brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than
mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such."

So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the
passage."]

     16.  They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and
straightforwardness.

     [Chang   Yu says:   "When you have attracted   them   by
substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity;
then they will work for you with all their might."]

     17.  Without subtle ingenuity of mind,  one cannot make
certain of the truth of their reports.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en says:   "Be on your guard against   the
possibility of spies going over to the service of the enemy."]

     18.  Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind
of business.

     [Cf. VI. ss. 9.]

     19.  If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before
the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man
to whom the secret was told.

     [Word for word, the translation here is:  "If spy matters
are heard before [our plans] are carried out," etc.  Sun Tzu's
main point in this passage is:  Whereas you kill the spy himself
"as a punishment for letting out the secret,"  the object of
killing the other man is only, as Ch`en Hao puts it, "to stop his
mouth"  and prevent news leaking any further.  If it had already
been repeated to others, this object would not be gained.  Either
way,  Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity,
though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves
to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the
secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of
him."]

     20.  Whether the object be to crush an army,  to storm a
city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to
begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-
camp,

     [Literally  "visitors",  is equivalent, as Tu Yu says,  to
"those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with
information,"  which naturally necessitates frequent interviews
with him.]
and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command.  Our
spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.

     [As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of
these important functionaries can be won over by bribery.]

     21.  The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be
sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed.

Thus they will become converted spies and available for our
service.
     22.  It is through the information brought by the converted
spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward
spies.

     [Tu Yu says:  "through conversion of the enemy's spies we
learn the enemy's condition."  And Chang Yu says:  "We must tempt
the converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows
which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of
the officials are open to corruption."]

     23.  It is owing to his information, again,  that we can
cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

     [Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the
enemy can best be deceived."]

     24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy
can be used on appointed occasions.
     25.  The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is
knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived,
in the first instance, from the converted spy.

     [As explained in ss. 22-24.  He not only brings information
himself,  but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to
advantage.]

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the
utmost liberality.
     26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

     [Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C.  Its
name was changed to Yin by P`an Keng in 1401.

was due to I Chih

     [Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman
who took part in Ch`eng T`ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.]

who had served under the Hsia.  Likewise, the rise of the Chou
dynasty was due to Lu Ya

     [Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin,
whom he afterwards helped to overthrow.  Popularly known as T`ai
Kung,  a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have
composed a treatise on war, erroneously identified with the
LIU T`AO.]

who had served under the Yin.

     [There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought
it well to introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on
the passage are by no means explicit.  But, having regard to the
context,  we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih
and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted spy,  or
something closely analogous.  His suggestion is, that the Hsia
and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of
their weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers
were able to impart to the other side.  Mei Yao-ch`en appears to
resent any such aspersion on these historic names:  "I Yin and Lu
Ya,"  he says, "were not rebels against the Government.  Hsia
could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him.  Yin could
not employ the latter, hence Hou employed him.  Their great
achievements were all for the good of the people."  Ho Shih is
also indignant:  "How should two divinely inspired men such as I
and Lu have acted as common spies?  Sun Tzu's mention of them
simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is
a matter which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I
and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task.
The above words only emphasize this point."  Ho Shih believes
then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their
supposed skill in the use of spies.  But this is very weak.]

     27.  Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise
general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for
purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.

     [Tu Mu closes with a note of warning:  "Just as water, which
carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of
sinking it, so reliance on spies, while production of great
results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."]

Spies are a most important element in water, because on them
depends an army's ability to move.

     [Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with
ears or eyes.]


[1]  "Aids to Scouting," p. 2.

[2]  "Marshal Turenne," p. 311.

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